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Abstract 
Naval counter-piracy measures off Somalia have failed to change the incentives for pirates, raising 
calls for land-based approaches that may involve replacing piracy as a source of income. This paper 
evaluates the effects of piracy on the Somali economy to establish which (domestic) groups benefit 
from ransom monies. Given the paucity of economic data on Somalia, we evaluate province-level 
market data, nightlight emissions and high resolution satellite imagery. We show that significant 
amounts of ransom monies are spent within Somalia. The impacts appear to be spread widely, 
benefiting the working poor and pastoralists and offsetting the food price shock of 2008 in the pirate 
provinces. Pirates appear to invest their money principally in the main cities of Garowe and Bosasso 
rather than in the backward coastal communities. 
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Introduction 
There is widespread agreement in the academic and naval communities that Somali piracy cannot be 
resolved from the sea but needs a land-based solution ((Boot (2009), Kraska and Wilson (2008), 
Menkhaus (2009), Percy and Shortland (2010), Bueger et al (2011)). Several years of naval counter-
piracy missions have “failed to strategically deter piracy”1. Pirates have simply shifted their attacks 
to ships not adopting best management practice and operate in the open sea to evade counter-
piracy measures in the Gulf of Aden (Shortland and Vothknecht (2010)). Since mid 2010 piracy off 
the coast of Somalia has changed in character. Pirates and navies have been become considerably 
more violent.2 Because of the increased difficulty of hijacking ships under the noses of warships from 
over 30 nations, pirates also seem to invest more resources into maximising the return from each 
captured ship. Ransom negotiations have dragged on for longer and have resulted in new record 
payments to pirates.3 Moreover, there are assertions that Al-Shabaab is offering attractive co-
operative agreements to pirates, i.e. piracy might at some stage be funding regional instability and 
terror.4 There are therefore strong incentives to try a fresh approach to resolving the issue of piracy 
off the Horn of Africa. 
Given that a large number of interest groups prevent the restoration of effective central governance 
in Somalia,5 a land-based solution might involve replacing piracy as a source of income to relevant 
local communities. However, it is currently far from clear where the beneficiaries from piracy are 
located (including whether or not the money is mostly channelled abroad) and how widely the 
benefits are spread.  Due to the absence of central government, we lack almost all conventional data 
on economic activity in Somalia since 1991.6 The methodological contribution of this paper is 
therefore to propose and evaluate a number of innovative indicators for economic activity in 
Somalia.  
We firstly evaluate data collected by internationally funded NGOs, monitoring rainfall7 and regional 
food and commodity prices8. The entries in many of these datasets are too sporadic to allow the 
creation of reliable time series indicators. They also show large regional variation in prices even in 
highly standardised commodities, indicating the profound fragmentation of the Somali economy. 
However, we argue that the presence and absence of data and the extent of unexploited arbitrage 
gains themselves convey important information about how well (informal) governance functions in 
Somalia. We show that 1) a significant proportion of pirate ransoms is converted into Somali 
                                                          
1
 Major General Buster Howes, Operational Commander of the EU Naval Forces, Conference on Future of 
Naval Forces RUSI London 6 July 2011 
2
 Hassan, Somali Pirates threaten to Kill Korean Hostages 23 Jan 2011 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/01/23/idINIndia-54338020110123 and Hulburt (2011) 
3
Interview with Steven Askins, also in Kim Somali Pirates release South Korean Tanker  Nov 8 2010 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2010/11/08/114674.htm  
4
 AEI Pirate Threat is Not Going Away 22 Feb 2011 http://www.aei.org/article/103204  
5
 See for example Menkhaus  (2007a) and Jeffrey Gettleman, In Somalia, Those Who Feed Off Anarchy Fuel It, 
Nytimes.com, April 25, 2007, at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/25/world/africa/25somalia.html 
6
 To the extent that these exist they are often rough estimates. For example the population estimate in the CIA 
world factbook is based on the 1975 census.  
7
 Somalia Water and Land Information Management 
8
 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation 
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Shillings, 2) that cattle prices have risen inter alia with the development of the pirate industry, 3) 
that consumers benefit from piracy through lower commodity prices and 4) that piracy has offset 
the loss of purchasing power of local wages after the 2007 / 08 food price shocks.  
Second, we analyse nightlight emissions from Somalia, which have recently been shown to be an 
excellent proxy for local and regional production and income in statistically challenged countries 
(Elvidge et al (2009), Henderson et al (2009)). We note that none of the “pirate towns” on the 
Puntland coast have enough power output to feature on the global nightlight chart. This supports 
the contention that coastal communities have not seen the full benefit of piracy. Instead the 
regional centres of Garowe and Bosasso, which provide the material inputs and the “fire power” of 
the pirate operations, as well as being less vulnerable to sea-based attacks, appear to benefit most 
from pirate-related inflows. Whereas nightlight emissions in other cities in Somalia were reduced 
after a series of economic shocks after 2007, Garowe and Bosasso bucked the trend and continued 
to grow and show increasing income differentials. 
Third we analyse changes in the built environment using high resolution satellite images from Eyl, 
Hobyo and Garowe to corroborate the results above. In Garowe we see massive investment in 
housing and hotels, infrastructure and religious and educational facilities between 2002 and 2009, 
with much of the development taking place in the latter part of the period. Eyl and Hobyo, however, 
have seen much less investment, although the former is often called Somalia’s “pirate capital”. 
There are a few more houses and a lot more cars, but the only clearly identifiable “public 
investment” in Hobyo is a large radio tower, which benefits both locals and pirates. In Eyl the most 
noticeable changes are a number of new perimeter walls around storage facilities, which may sugest 
tensions in the relationship between pirates and the host community. 
Overall, the results confirm the insights of the literature on aid effectiveness in Somalia and 
expatriates’ cash transfers into the Somali economy: Somalia retains a deep-seated “culture of 
sharing” and has developed financial networks to facilitate the spreading of resources within the 
country (Lindley (2010), Horst (2006), Ali et al (2005)). Piracy appears to lead to widespread 
economic development and potentially a very large interest group for its continuation. However, 
Puntland’s coastal communities may be open to a negotiated solution which makes them better off 
than piracy. The international community should bear both these results in mind when developing 
land-based strategies to resolve Somalia’s pirate problem. 
The paper is organised as follows: the following section gives some background on Somalia and the 
business of piracy. Section 3 discusses the available data on economic activity and models the effects 
of Piracy on various aspects of the Puntland economy. Section 4 checks these results against 
information obtained from satellite images. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2: Background on Somalia 
The Political Situation 
The United Republic of Somalia was formed from the former British protectorate of Somaliland and 
Italian Somalia and became independent in 1960. From 1969 to 1991 Somalia was governed 
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autocratically by Mohammed Said Barre. His corrupt administration was based on cold-war fuelled 
foreign aid and “divide-and-rule” tactics, which generated deep animosities between clans. When 
Western aid was drastically reduced after 1989, state failure was almost inevitable and a full scale 
civil war erupted in 1991. Since then Somalia has become the archetypal failed state. Neither the 
Somali people nor the international community have been able to configure and place a stable and 
effective government in Mogadishu (Menkhaus (2007a), Soerenson (2008)). Consequently the World 
Bank’s quality of governance data put Somalia right at the bottom of international comparison 
tables.9 
However, Menkhaus (2007b) and Leeson (2007) argue persuasively that absence of government 
does not necessarily mean absence of governance. In Somalia clans10 have filled the vacuum left by 
the absence of central authority in the regions and form the backbone of governance. Local courts 
backed by clan elders, business people and clergy take responsibility for maintaining law and order. 
In most areas these local governance structures are strong enough for people to transact with 
confidence, as the success of trust-based money transfer companies in Somalia shows (Lindley 
2009). Nenova and Harford (2004) outline some of the innovative approaches of private 
entrepreneurs in Somalia to substitute for the lack of government public goods provision. Walls 
(2009) argues that the embedded social norms are strong enough to achieve relatively peaceful 
consensual governance in Somaliland. Indeed, it can be argued that in many cases these informal 
arrangements provide better outcomes than the previous, predatory government (Leeson 2007). 
However, Somalia also continues to see episodes of armed fighting as various militias assert rival 
claims on power. One upshot of this political instability is widespread displacement and poverty. 
Somalia is one of the poorest countries in the world with per capita GDP estimated at 273 US$. In 
2010 Somalia was ranked number 224 out of 227 countries in terms of its GDP per capita at PPP.11 A 
quarter of the population relies on food aid provided by the World Food Programme.12 Another 
symptom of the absence of central government has been the development of a thriving piracy 
business in the Gulf of Aden, the wider Somali Basin and beyond.  
The Somali Economy and the Pirate “Industry” 
Few specific details are known about the Somali economy. The IMF’s 2009 assessment of Somalia 
simply states that the Somali government “has not been able to restore order” and that the 
“absence of an internationally recognised government and official information about economic and 
financial developments precludes a full assessment…”.13 The CIA Factbook notes that Somalia has 
maintained a “healthy informal economy” despite the absence of central government.14 The CIA 
estimates that 65% of GDP comes from agriculture and fishing. Most of the industrial production 
based around food processing collapsed as factories were looted during fighting, but there is a 
                                                          
9
 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
10
 Kinship groups tracing their lineage back to a common ancestor. 
11
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html?countryName=Somalia&countryCode=so&regionCode=af&rank=224#so 
accessed August 2010 
12
 “Countries – Somalia”, World Food Programme, http://www.wfp.org/countries/somalia  
13
 IMF (2009) p3 
14
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html  
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service sector (around 25% of GDP) based around the intermediation of remittances from and 
telecommunications with the Somali Diaspora.15  
Despite the lack of detailed information about the employment and output of the different sectors, 
we attempt to pin down the relative importance of piracy in the Somali economy. A considerable 
number of people appear to be directly employed in the piracy business. Kraska and Wilson (2009a) 
estimated that as many as 5000 Somali men were working as pirates, divided into five large groups. 
Firstly there are those directly involved in the hijacking. Pirates generally operate in teams consisting 
of a “mothership” and two to three small, open, high-powered wooden fishing boats (skiffs). Each 
skiff’s crew generally consists of up to 8 people: One ex-fisherman who is responsible for navigating, 
one person to operate the technical apparatus and the rest ex-militia men with extensive experience 
of using firearms.16 Hijacked ships are steered into Somali territorial waters and anchored a few 
miles off the coast. The guarding of the ship then tends to be subcontracted to local militias, with up 
to 50 people on each ship and another 50 on the coast.17  
The owner of the ship is contacted by experienced negotiators with reasonable English language 
skills (often former teachers). Some of the hostages (generally including the captain) are taken off 
the ship and are guarded in local households. This discourages the remaining crew and foreign 
troops from attempting to take control of a hijacked ship.18 As the Somali piracy business is based on 
ransoming the crew, hostages are treated reasonably well. In 2010, the IMB reported 1016 hostages 
being taken by Somali pirates and in need of food - creating employment for local cooks, producers 
and traders.19 There are even reports that restaurants have sprung up to cater for the needs of the 
hostages.20 Individual pirates’ profits are estimated at about US$10-45,000.21 Compared to Somalia’s 
annual per capita income of 273 US$, piracy is clearly a financially attractive career for unemployed 
young men.22   
A single pirate hijack can result in a ransom ranging from US$500,000 to a record US$9.0 million in 
2010.23 As ransom amounts are often kept as a commercial secret, estimates of total incomes from 
piracy in Somalia come in all sizes, mostly vastly inflated. About US$40 million were paid in ransoms 
                                                          
15
 Lindley (2009) and Seikh and Healy (2009) provide overviews of this sector 
16
 Hunter, Somali Pirates living the High Life 28 Oct 2008 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7650415.stm  
17
 
17
Marc Engelhardt (2009): “Piraten vor Somalia” Zeit online http://www.zeit.de/online/2009/17/piraten-
somalia  
18
 Interviews with ransom negotiators, see also Walker, Inside Story of a Somali  Pirate Attack; 4 June 2009 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8080098.stm  
19
 IMB Piracy Report (2010) 
20
 Knaup, The Poor Fishermen of Somalia 12 April 2008 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,594457,00.html 
21
 Gilpin Raymond, (2009); More recent estimates are considerably higher though, in the region of $40,0000. 
Bahadur Pirates inc 23 June 2010 
http://www.gaops.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=326:23-june-2010-pirates-inc-by-
jay-bahadur-as-published-in-ft&catid=3:news&Itemid=13   
22
 Osma We are Hungry 12 Dec 2008  
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article5327626.ece  
23
Kim Somali Pirates release South Korean Tanker  Nov 8 2010 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2010/11/08/114674.htm  
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in 2008.24 A realistic estimate for 2009 is in the region of US$70 million.25 To put this into context, in 
2008 and 2009 the official government budgets of Puntland province were US$11.7 million and 
US$17.6 million respectively.26 The proceeds of total official cattle exports from Somalia in 2009 are 
in the region of US$ 43 million.27 Piracy therefore potentially generates a large amount of foreign 
exchange receipts and income relative to the size of the Somali (and especially the Puntland) 
economy.  
The proceeds of piracy are shared between the pirates, the guards, the negotiation teams, the 
financiers of the piracy expeditions and bribes for local officials.28 The UN estimates that 40% of the 
proceeds fund local employment directly, of which the pirate crews get 30% and those employed on 
the land-side operations 10%. Another 10% is paid in gifts and bribes to the local community, while 
50% is paid to the financiers and “sponsors” of the business, which are often said to be based 
abroad.29 If the money was spent locally so as to create multiplier effects, it could have a 
transforming effect on deprived coastal communities, impoverished by years of economic 
uncertainty and illegal and destructive overfishing. 
The testimony of locals interviewed on the effect of piracy on the economy is, however, conflicting.30  
On the one hand, piracy is said to bring a lot of direct employment opportunities to the local 
community. In addition pirate financiers and ex-pirates are said to be investing in local businesses 
and contributing to the provision of local governance and public goods.31 Any form of conspicuous 
consumption requires employing private security guards around the person, car(s) and compound, 
generating further employment opportunities.32  
On the other hand there are complaints that the participation of locals in the gains generated by 
piracy is negligible, because much of it is moved abroad funding property purchases in Nairobi or 
Mombasa.33  Money spent on imported status goods such as SUVs does not create local multiplier 
                                                          
24
 Menkhaus(2009), p. 23. 
25
 Personal communication Bundespolizei, Luft- und Seesicherheit, Bundesministerium des Innern, Germany 
26
Garowe Online, Puntland Cabinet Passes 2009 Budget 2 May 2009 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200905040544.html  
27
 Based on total exports and average cattle prices reported by FSNAU 
28
Knaup (2008) “Prelude to Piracy” http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,594457,00.html  
29
Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1811 (2008), 
United Nations, 10 December 2008, available at:  http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/604/73/PDF/N0860473.pdf?OpenElement . See also Bahadur Pirates inc 23 
June 2010 http://www.gaops.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=326:23-june-2010-
pirates-inc-by-jay-bahadur-as-published-in-ft&catid=3:news&Itemid=13 
30
 Osma We are Hungry 12 Dec 2008  
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article5327626.ece 
ABC Radio Problem Pirates of Somalia 28 February 2010 
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/backgroundbriefing/stories/2010/2826603.htm  
31
Marc Engelhardt (2009): “Piraten vor Somalia” Zeit online http://www.zeit.de/online/2009/17/piraten-
somalia 
32
 Interviews with Somalis suggest that the” conspicuous consumption of security” in itself is a status symbol. 
33
Associated Press, Somali Pirates behind Kenya Property Boom?  1 Jan 2010  
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34661327/; Inside Somalia Nairobi: Somali capital is Pushing up Property 
Prices 29 June 2009 http://insidesomalia.org/200906291404/News/Business/Nairobi-Somali-capital-is-
pushing-up-property-prices.html 
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effects.34 Critics of piracy also express concern that the local poor suffer because piracy is generating 
inflation and disrupting trade flows causing price increases in important commodity prices.35 
Residents in coastal communities often complain that they are not participating in the gains from 
piracy.36 
Overall, there is therefore considerable uncertainty regarding the effect of ransom payments on the 
Somali economy. To create a land-based solution we firstly need to know the proportion of ransoms 
that actually benefit the local economy. Secondly we need to evaluate the extent to which any 
inflows create positive or negative spill-overs for local communities and hence the size of the pro-
pirate lobby which needs to be “bought off”. Thirdly, we need to know where the main beneficiaries 
of piracy are located.   
 
Literature on Cash Transfers and Economic Development in Somalia 
To shed more light on the likely consequences of piracy incomes on the Somali economy, we consult 
the literature on cash transfers into Somalia. Cash transfers come in the form of foreign aid and in 
the form of remittances from the Somali diaspora. Country experts point to a deep-rooted “culture 
of sharing”.37 Well-off people raise their social status by sharing resources within social (mostly clan-
based) networks, where individuals have an obligation to assist other members. A Somali proverb 
says: “The man who owns 100 goats, but his relatives have nothing, he is poor”.38 There is a clear 
economic rationale for this cultural norm in a pastoral and nomadic society in an arid and therefore 
marginal environment. Dispersing investments and assets geographically within the wider clan is a 
very effective risk reduction strategy when entire herds are regularly wiped out by drought or 
conflict (Horst 2006). The large financial networks that have sprung up to facilitate the remittances 
of the worldwide Somali diaspora to family back in Somalia or in refugee camps in Kenya are a 
testimony to the strength of this tradition of sharing resources. Recipients of remittances in Somalia 
often further share the remittances locally (Lindley 2010). Leeson (2009) backs this up with the 
observation that Somalia has been able to improve its performance on a number of human 
development indicators despite the absence of government. 
Further evidence for a deep-seated culture of sharing and a well developed financial infrastructure 
comes from NGOs delivering aid to drought-stricken communities in central Somalia using cash 
transfer programmes (Majid (2006), Ali et al (2005)). Despite considerable skepticism in the aid 
community about the effectiveness of cash as an instrument in humanitarian response, Oxfam, Horn 
Relief and Norwegian People’s Aid evaluated their cash relief programmes as successful. Aid was 
well targeted at the most vulnerable households identified at consensual meetings at the village 
                                                          
34
 Hareper, Growing Sophistication of Somali Pirates 11 April 2010 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7995170.stm  
35
 Hunter, Somali Pirates living the High Life 28 Oct 2008  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7650415.stm ; http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8103585.stm  
36
 Knaup, The Poor Fishermen of Somalia 12 April 2008 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,594457,00.html  
37
 E.g. Ali et al (2005) p 11 
38
 Cited in Lindley (2010) p73 
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level. There was minimal evidence that funds were diverted to the better off or misused to buy khat 
or weapons. The local cash transfer companies were well able to handle the volume of transactions. 
Mostly the money was used to repay loans, which unblocked previously frozen credit lines, 
benefiting poor pastoralists, local traders and water trucking companies.  
Finally, whenever well-off people choose to engage in conspicuous consumption, this generates local 
employment, even if the goods are imported. Conspicuous consumption in Somalia requires private 
protection: using an SUV also requires the employment of a chauffeur and at least one armed guard, 
preferably several. Owning a “nice villa” requires a watchman or members of the wider family to 
look after the property whenever it is empty (Lindley 2010). A Somali interviewee summed up the 
two ways in which one could gain social status in Somali society as the following: “Sharing - and the 
conspicuous consumption of security”.  
 
The related literature therefore suggests that the most likely developmental effect of piracy would 
be one of widespread but incremental progress rather than conspicuous consumption by the few. 
Interviews with pirate bosses back this up, too. Pirate chief Abshir Boyah questioned on how he 
spent his considerable profits from piracy simply referred to his extended clan network: “it’s not like 
three people split a million bucks. It’s more like three hundred.”  Another pirate boss, Mohamed 
Abdi laughed off the UN threat to freeze pirate assets: “What assets?”39  
 
 
3. Data analysis 
3.1. Data 
Somalia does not have a statistical service. However, a number of NGOs are collecting data to 
monitor threats to food security in this poor, conflict-ridden and drought-prone country. In the 
following section we introduce these data and data sources to capture various aspects of 
development in Somalia, explore their interrelations and how they are affected by the growth of 
piracy in Puntland.   
3.1.1. Dependent variables 
The data used were obtained from the Somali Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU), an 
NGO funded by a number of international donors.40 The FSNAU’s work in Somalia is concerned 
primarily with food security among the poorest in Somali Society. For this purpose it reports 
commodity prices and daily wages in regional markets in Somalia, as well as collecting information 
about exports of goats, sheep, camels and cattle. Price data are collected every Monday and 
                                                          
39
 Gettleman, The Pirates are Winning 14 Sept 2010  
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/oct/14/pirates-are-winning/  
40
 http://www.fsnau.org/ 
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averaged over the month. If no price is available for a certain commodity, then this generally means 
that it was not traded during the period.41  
Wages 
FSNAU reports the daily wage rate for occasional labourers presenting themselves for work at the 
local market. The first observation to make about daily wage rates is that wages differ widely 
between the markets. The highest wages are paid in Somaliland, which has managed to create 
political and economic stability. Similarly high wages are paid in the border regions with Kenya 
where cities are said to be of “strategic importance” - especially during times of heightened security 
issues. It appears that these result in a relative shortage of people available for casual civilian work – 
either due to displacement or because labourers are drawn into local militias. 
Because most hijacked ships are taken to the Puntland coast during ransom negotiations, we focus 
on the three provinces that make up Puntland: Bari, Nugal and Muduq, of which the latter two 
contain the main pirate towns of Eyl, Hobyo and Gharadeere. In Bari data are collected in Bosasso, 
which is a thriving trading centre based around a harbour handling much of Somalia’s imports and 
exports. For Nugal and Muduq data are from the regional cities of Garowe and Galkaio respectively. 
As a comparator we use the Southern coastal province of Banaadir, which includes Mogadishu. From 
diagram (1) it appears that nominal daily wages in the pirate provinces of Nugal and Muduq have 
caught up with or even overtaken the non-pirate regions since the explosion of piracy (and hence 
ransom incomes) in 2008.  
However, when we calculate the “real wage” by dividing the local wage rate by the local price of a 
staple (1kg of rice or sorghum), it becomes clear that people in the pirate provinces do not feel that 
they have gained from piracy, because nominal wage gains have been entirely offset by the food 
price increases of 2007/08 (diagram 2). Puntlanders have made gains – but only relative to the rest 
of the country, where the food price increases have massively eroded real wages. In the analysis 
below, therefore, we analyse real wages in Puntland with Banaadir as a comparison. 
 
Exchange rate 
The Somali Shilling is neither backed by a government, nor is there any monetary authority. Many 
transactions are conducted in US$, but the Somali Shilling continues to circulate and is used in 
transactions locally. It appears to be simply upheld by “common assent” and remittances from 
abroad.42 We evaluate the effect of piracy on the average exchange rate across markets to examine 
the macro-economic effects of the development of a new industry generating foreign exchange. We 
compare the effects of piracy on the exchange rate to other export sectors to gauge how much of 
the ransom payments find their way into local currency transactions. Because the exchange rate is 
trending upwards we analyze the percentage depreciation in the month-on-month SSh / US$ rate. 
This series is stationary.  
                                                          
41
Personal communication with Kamau Wanjohi, data manager at FSNAU 
42
 Somalis also referred to the Shilling’s greater “legitimacy of utilisation” in a climate of suspicion or hostility 
regarding the USA in interviews. The Economist, Commerce Among Chaos, Feb 10 2011  
http://www.economist.com/node/18119051  
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Cattle Prices 
We use the SSh price of cattle in regional markets as a proxy for spill-over effects of piracy into the 
wider economy. “Local quality” cattle are an investment rather than a consumption good (the main 
meat consumed being mutton or goat). Ceteris paribus, cattle price increases related to piracy would 
indicate that local nomadic communities are participating in the gains from piracy.  
Rice prices 
We use month-on month changes in the average price charged for 1kg of the food staple “imported 
red rice” as tracked by FSNAU to determine whether there are inflationary effects of ransoms 
(proxied by lagged successes). We also test whether there is evidence that increases in the total 
number of incidents deter overseas traders. 
 
3.1.2. Variable of Interest: Piracy 
Information on pirate attacks is published annually in the International Maritime Bureau’s 
Annual Piracy Report. The IMB publishes narratives on all incidents of piracy reported (voluntarily) 
by captains and ship-owners. From the narratives we can distinguish between successful and 
unsuccessful hijacking attempts. One way to measure the strength of the piracy “industry” is a count 
of the number of all the reported incidents in the relevant month. Perhaps more relevant from the 
point of view of local development are the incidents of successful piracy. We code as a “success” any 
reported incident where the pirates either stole property from the ship or (most often) hijacked a 
ship and ultimately extracted a ransom payment from the owners. We use several lags of this 
variable, as ransom negotiations take some time to conclude.  
In the analysis we use the (lagged) total number of incidents of piracy, the incidents of piracy 
averaged over the last 6 months and the (lagged) incidents of successful piracy. The former 
measures the impact of the industry as a whole on the economy, while the latter captures money 
inflows through ransom payments. As successes are subset of total incidents (and highly correlated) 
they are not simultaneously statistically significant.  
 
3.1.3. Control variables 
Governance / Infrastructure / Instability 
Somalia has slowly rebuilt its physical and institutional infrastructure after the high intensity phase 
of the civil conflict in the 1990s. However, outbreaks of violence have continued in recent years, 
with varying degrees of intensity and the geographic spread. We would expect trading activity to be 
aided by improvements in institutional and physical infrastructure and reduced when conflict 
intensity increases. In the absence of concrete information on monthly variations in governance 
quality we construct a number of innovative proxies for violent conflict and the ease of trading and 
contracting.  
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We use data collected by the Somalia Water and Land Information management agency (SWALIM).43 
SWALIM is funded by development agencies, the EU and the United Nations. It attempted to rebuild 
the data collection network for rainfall and river stream-flow data in Somalia following the civil war. 
Data collection simply required locating a measuring gauge in a particular way, reading daily data 
and sending a monthly report in the post. Although the well resourced SWALIM was an exceptionally 
attractive employer, it found it very difficult to reach many of the old stations and in several cases 
had to site stations in alternative locations.  
Once a station was under contract, rainfall data are often patchy. Occasionally contracted stations 
simply did not submit a report to SWALIM, so that days or whole months are missing (diagram 3). 
Apparently this was generally linked to a worsening security situation – i.e. staff could not leave their 
homes or fled the area because of territorial disputes.44 Several stations were discontinued after 
reporting lapsed for a number of months, which explains the occasional drop in the number of 
stations contracted. In July 2009 manual rainfall data collection was abandoned in favour of 
computerized data collection in a small number of locations. For this reason we have extrapolated 
the data through 2010 at the last observed level. 
 Contractual environment: We use the percentage of pre-war stations contracted as a proxy 
for the feasibility of entering into a long-term contract / supply relationship and building 
(very) basic infrastructure. 
 
 
Analogous to the missing rainfall data above, the market data provided by FSNAU often miss 
observations for a number of markets in the time series. Again this is caused by traders not trading 
in a market because of a worsening security situation, or because the observer was unable to travel 
or otherwise obtain the information (diagram 4). A further interesting feature of the FSNAU 
commodity datasets is the considerable spread of prices between markets. Even in commodities 
which are high value to weight, large gains from arbitrage remain unexploited. For example the 
exchange rate between the US$ and the Somali Shilling exhibits large regional variations – even 
though hawala networks ensure that traders would not have to travel with cash US$ between 
regional centres to take advantage of arbitrage gains. Ali et al (2005) note that within the province of 
Sool beneficiaries of US$ denominated cash relief faced variations in the exchange rate of 35%. The 
standard deviation of the exchange rate as a percentage of its mean value is therefore proposed 
here as a proxy of local monopolies and information problems. The much larger variation in the local 
rice and sorghum prices occurs because of the additional problems encountered merchants who 
have to physically transport their goods to markets over rickety physical infrastructures and with the 
need to make arrangements for private protection against opportunistic gangs. (Diagram 5) 
 
We use the following proxies constructed from the FSNAU market data: 
 
                                                          
43
 Somalia Water and Land Information Management (SWALIM), www.faoswalim.org.  
44
 Information reported by SWALIM 
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 Instability / Missing markets: Number of markets in which no rice (or alternatively sorghum) 
price was reported for a given month.45 
 Unexploited Arbitrage gains: We use the standard deviation of the rice and US$ exchange 
rate relative to the monthly mean as a proxy for local monopolies and the ease of trading 
and safe movement inside Somalia.  
 
Finally we use a UIC dummy to control for the massive political instability during the period of the 
contested rule of the Union of Islamic Courts from June to December 2006. 
 
Exports 
We use the FNSAU data on the exports of cattle from Somali harbours to control for legal foreign 
exchange earnings as well as another indicator for the ease of doing business and transporting goods 
over large distances. In months when the FSNAU did not report any export figures, we have assumed 
that no exports took place because the situation was too chaotic to risk transporting these 
important assets.  
 
Seasonality 
Trading could also have a seasonal pattern. This might be either because of the increased availability 
of certain types of agricultural produce at certain types of year, or because trade winds make the 
transport of goods easier or more difficult at certain times of year. Finally, Ramadan might be a 
special time for trading activity. We included dummies for the timing of the Ramadan and the 
monsoon seasons and report them where appropriate.  
 
World Market Prices 
We use the FAO food price and cereal price indices to control for food price changes worldwide. 
There was a major hike in food prices in 2008, which was only partially reversed in 2009 and 2010. 
 
Time effects 
A count variable was included in some model specifications to strip out possible pure time effects in 
prices and exchange rates. Because the ineffective transitional governments have been unable to 
generate tax revenues, they occasionally have new bank notes printed abroad to cover 
expenditures, generating inflation. Similarly, it is possible that social networks, governance and 
infrastructure were simply rebuilt over time as the country recovered from the ravages of the high 
intensity civil war.  However, the proxies for quality of informal governance (which are highly 
correlated with the count variable) outperformed the pure count variable, which is therefore not 
included in the models reported below. 
 
 
3.2. Methodology, Results and Interpretation 
                                                          
45
 Missing rice and sorghum markets are correlated but not identical. Rice is imported and is therefore well 
represented in coastal markets with more sporadic availability in the centre and vice versa for the Sorghum 
produced in the interior. 
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We either used differences or deflators to create stationary time series or included lagged variables 
to strip out time effects. We use OLS regression and checked that the residuals do not exhibit a time 
trend and are normally distributed. Where we analyse regional time series, we have not interpolated 
or otherwise replaced missing values, as these are mostly associated with difficult circumstances for 
trading or observing trading. Where we analyse average price series, we have calculated the average 
across all markets that are reporting data for the month.  
 
3.2.1. Wage regressions 
The regression the real wage series are shown in table 1. The real wages of casual workers in Bari, 
Muduq and Nugaal have risen significantly in response to the establishment of the piracy industry.46 
Partially this may reflect the direct employment effects, but it is likely to also reflect effects of 
ransom-funded investments into local businesses and construction activities. Interestingly no such 
effect is observed for Banaadir, which has a long coastline and several ports, but only sees very 
occasional acts of piracy. This result may help to allay concerns about the result being driven by 
reverse causality, i.e. the Somalis going a-pirating in response to deteriorating living standards.47 
Of the control variables we see the expected effect of the erosion of real wages when international 
food prices rise and with the depreciation of the Somali Shilling. Interestingly our proxies for conflict 
intensity (missing markets and the UIC dummy) indicate that casual labourers benefit from 
instability. This could be because some of the occasional labourers are drawn into local militias (i.e. 
increased demand for labour) or because people migrate, reducing the supply of available workers. 
Cattle exports have the expected positive effect on wages indicating that greater demand for a 
domestically produced good improves opportunities for local labour. Finally the South West 
Monsoon which makes the import of foreign goods more difficult reduces wages - probably through 
reduced demand for labour involved in trade, transport and production relying on foreign imports.  
 
3.2.2. Exchange Rate Regressions 
The results for the exchange rate series are reported in table 2. The regressions indicate that piracy 
works exactly in the same way as the cattle export sector by supplying additional US$, raising the 
price of the Somali Shilling (table 2). However, it seems to take some time (5 months) before 
successful hijackings translate into increased demand for Somali shillings. Given that ransom 
negotiations generally take between 2-4 months, this suggests that pirates conduct their 
                                                          
46
 We report the 6 month moving average, but qualitatively the same result is found for a 5 month moving 
average or the natural log of (1+monthly intensity). 
47
 In any case pay-offs from the pirate business far exceed the returns from casual labour. Pirate kings in 
addition tend to recruit people who own guns – i.e. not poor casual workers. Changes in the daily wage rate 
are therefore unlikely to have much of an impact on potential recruits. Bahadur, I’m not a pirate, 16 April 2009 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article6100783.ece  
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transactions in a parallel US$ economy.48 The effects of piracy on the exchange rate are only in the 
second round of spending as those paid by pirates in US$ exchange this into local currency.  
Comparing the coefficients of the cattle and pirate success variables, a single success was on average 
“worth” 1650 cattle to the SSh exchange rate. At 2009 average cattle prices this means that in the 
region of US$ 450,000 flow into the SSh-denominated local economy. While this is low compared to 
recently reported ransom records, one should bear in mind that until late 2008 ransoms tended to 
be below US$ 1 million. Also, a significant proportion of hijacked ships are “small fry” such as fishing 
trawlers and Dhows rather than fully loaded supertankers. With 44 successful hijacks in 2009 the 
result suggests local residents in Somalia gained around US$21mn out of total payments of US$ 
70mn. This is very close to the UK Foreign Office and MoD estimate based on local sources that 
about one third of ransoms stay in the country.49  
Of the control variables, we see that the international rise in food prices had the expected effect of 
increasing the rate of depreciation of the SSh, as additional US$ were needed to pay for imports. 
There is also a significant effect of regional price variation on the exchange rate. When markets are 
thin and traders charge monopoly prices it appears that customers respond by reducing their 
purchases of foreign currency and imported goods.  
 
3.2.3. Rice prices 
Table 3 reports the results for the rice price series. The average rice prices in regional markets in 
Somalia have, if anything, fallen due to piracy. The food price rises observed when piracy exploded in 
2008 were due to international rather than local or national developments, as shown by the highly 
significant FAO food price index. Claims about piracy creating inflation are therefore likely to have 
been caused by confusion about trends in international food prices. The result that the growth of 
the pirate industry has lowered the average price of imported rice (over and above their positive 
effect in raising the purchasing power of Somali Shillings discussed above) might be explained by 
pirates providing local governance and stability which has the side effect of helping other 
entrepreneurs to trade more easily as well.50 An alternative explanation might be that SUVs acquired 
by successful pirates are used for transporting merchandise (see below).   
The rest of the control variables also have the expected signs. Exchange rate depreciation raised the 
domestic currency price of the imported rice. The North-East trade wind significantly lowers the cost 
of transporting imports across the Indian Ocean. Our proxies for quality of governance and ease of 
trading show that the rice price rises when traders have greater monopoly power (i.e. when regional 
variation in exchange rates increased) and was reduced as contracting over large distances became 
more reliable.  
 
                                                          
48
 Cars are imported and therefore require hard currency, real estate appears to be priced in US$.   
49
 Personal communication received at a Cabinet Office hosted cross-Whitehall meeting in London in March 
2011 
50
 See for example Gambetta (1993) about the use of mafia-provided “protection” by ordinary citizens 
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3.2.4. Cattle Prices 
From the cattle price regressions reported in table 4 we have evidence that piracy drives up the 
price of this investment good, benefiting pastoralists by raising the value of their assets. In all 
provinces we see that the general strength of the pirate industry is associated with an increase in 
cattle prices. In Muduq an alternative model specification shows that we can link increases in cattle 
prices directly to pirate successes in the past. If a count variable is included in the regression (which 
has a correlation coefficient of 0.72 with piracy) the piracy coefficients and significance levels are 
slightly lower, but the statistical significance of the piracy variable is retained in Bari and Muduq.  
 
3.3. Summary 
To summarise, we were able to demonstrate widespread and significant benefits to the Somali 
economy from pirate incomes. Only a fraction of ransoms are exchanged into Somali Shillings, but 
people relying on imported food staples benefit from greater purchasing power. There are clear 
“trickle-down” effects from pirates and other beneficiaries of ransoms employing casual labour. 
Pastoralists also benefit from increasing affluence and investment through higher cattle prices. 
We also see that there is significant explanatory power in the unusual proxies for changes in the 
business environment as Somalia rebuilt itself after the civil war in fits and starts – despite lacking a 
central government. Missing markets, changes in the extent of local monopoly power and the ability 
of a well-funded organization to contract effectively over long distances appear to capture important 
aspects of the quality of informal governance in Somalia.  
From the analysis above we were able to demonstrate the positive impact of piracy in the regional 
centres of Puntland where the FSNAU collects data. In the following section we go a step further and 
try and pin down local effects and identify the main beneficiaries of piracy within Puntland. 
   
4. Evidence from Satellite Images 
4.1. Nighttime light emissions 
There is now a growing awareness of the potential applications of satellite imagery of the earth in 
the social sciences. There are a number of studies demonstrating the relationship between night-
time light emissions and economic parameters such as urban development51, economic activity52 
and poverty53. The use of this approach seems to be particularly promising in the context of an 
underdeveloped country such as Somalia, where terrestrial data collection is sporadic and unreliable 
and where changes in light emissions are a clear sign of changes in disposable income rather than 
changes in environmental awareness. 
                                                          
51
 Imhoff et al (1997) 
52
 Gosh et al (2009), Henderson et al (2009) 
53
 Elvidge et al (2009) 
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Most of Somalia’s electrical infrastructure was damaged or destroyed in the civil war. The main 
company responsible for electricity generation and supply in Somalia is the government-owned Ente 
Nazionale Energia Elettrica (ENEE), but there are also some private providers.  ENEE’s electricity 
generations facilities are predominantly located around the capital Mogadishu and some in the 
major towns of Puntland and Somaliland. Neither of the three pirate settlements has a power-
station. Electricity generation is therefore often at the household using Diesel generators, which are 
unaffordable (to buy or run) for poor households. However, some private entrepreneurs offer 
electricity contracts using second-hand generators bought in Dubai (Nenova and Harford 2005). 
 
We used the nightlight pictures available from NOAA satellite and information systems from 2000- 
2009.54 The images are annual records of “stable nightlights”, i.e. a composite of all images of each 
location taken by a series of satellites each evening over a year. The detected light emissions are a 
function of several factors, including emitted intensity, the size of the target and emission 
wavelength. Individual camera shots are disregarded if there is cloud cover or moon glare. Lights 
which only occur occasionally are excluded to ensure that the dataset does not record lights emitted 
by fires or thunderstorms. The intensity of light emissions is measured on a scale of 0 to 64, of which 
observations at the bottom end of the spectrum (1 to 3) are censored to reduce noise in the data.55 
 
At the sensor system’s brightness setting used for illustrating global nightlights Somalia is not visible 
at all. Increasing the brightness setting Mogadishu, Hargeisa and Bosasso are the first settlements to 
appear. None of the well known pirate villages, Eyl, Hobyo or Gharardeere emit sufficient light to be 
visible on the nightlight images available from NOAA, even when using the maximum brightness and 
contrast settings in Adobe Photoshop Elements 7.0 (diagram 6). The only visible coastal settlement 
in Puntland is Bosasso on the Northern coast bordering the Gulf of Aden. This is the principal city 
and harbour of Puntland as well as the capital of the province of Bari. The capitals of the provinces 
Muduq and Nugaal (Garowe and Galkaio) are also visible on the nighttime images and increase in 
brightness and size over time.56  
 
 
4.1.1. Analysis 
The nightlights analysis tracks 15 cities in Somalia from 2000-2009 for which nighttime lights appear 
regularly in the NOAA Images.57 We used ArcGIS (9.3) software. We discarded all zero observations 
and created a polygon around each city for each year. We used the Spatial Analyst tool to extract the 
following information from each city’s nightlight image: The total amount of light emitted from each 
city-polygon, the total number of lit pixels detected by the satellite and the light intensity score of 
the brightest pixel. 
                                                          
54
 http://noaasis.noaa.gov/NOAASIS/  
55
 See Henderson et al (2009) for more details 
56
 Generally speaking an increase in light emissions can create ”bleeding”, or spillovers from the brightly lit 
pixel into adjacent pixels and therefore the perceived change in size of the settlement can reflect either an 
increase in size or greater electricity consumption. However, in Somalia, none of the pixels is even remotely 
close to saturation and the observed growth can therefore be attributed to changes in settlement size. 
57
 Baydabho, Beletweyne, Berbera, Boraama, Bosasso, Burao, Erigavo, Galkaio, Garowe, Hargeisa, Jowhar 
Kismaio, Lasanood, Mogadishu, Quardho. Berbera, Hargeisa and Mogadishu are considerably larger and richer 
than the other cities and are therefore excluded from the illustration graphs. 
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Total electricity consumption increases over time in the Puntland and Somaliland both in terms of 
rising access to electricity (more pixels being lit) and rising light intensity in the better-off areas of 
towns. After 2007, however, we see a marked downturn in total light emissions in 12 of the 15 cities; 
the exceptions are Garowe, Bosasso and Kismayo (diagram 7). The pronounced general decrease in 
light emissions can be linked to the massive increases in global food and energy prices in 2008, the 
beginning of below average rainfalls across the country, the resumption of violence in South Central 
and potentially a slowdown of diaspora remittances as the global economy began to suffer from the 
financial crisis.  
 
The pattern of total lit areas of the towns confirm the generalized decline in electricity consumption 
in Somalia after 2007 – we see that many poor or less densely settled areas completely disappear 
from the nightlights images (diagram 8). In Garowe and Bosasso the decline is delayed to 2009, but it 
does occur. The only city to increase its light emissions is the harbor city of Kismayo in South Central. 
Kismayo was captured by the Islamist Al Shabaab militia in August 2008. It appears that basic 
provision of electricity was restored in the town by the Al Shabaab administration in 2009.  
 
Finally we examine the light emissions from the brightest pixel in each city as a proxy for changes in 
wealth and disposable income of the richest (diagram 9). There are only three cities in the dataset 
where the brightest nightlights of 2009 exceed those of 2007: in Hargeisa (rising from 48 to 50), 
Garowe (9 to 12) and Bosasso (20-25).  
 
4.1.2. Result and interpretation 
To summarise the results of the nightlights data: disposable income in Somalia has declined 
considerably due to adverse local, regional and global developments since 2007, hitting the poorest 
particularly hard and generally also affecting the richer sections of society. The only two cities which 
defy this general pattern are Garowe and in Bosasso where the growth in electricity of consumption 
of the richest has more than offset declines in the spending power of the poor. Both cities are 
generally perceived to be closely associated with piracy. Indeed, the growth spurt of both cities 
begins after 2005, which is perceived to be the watershed in terms of transforming piracy from the 
extraction of fines to hijack and ransom operations. It accelerates with the “explosion” of piracy in 
the Gulf of Aden in 2008.58 
 
Garowe is at the heart of the pirates’ tribal heartland (Hansen (2009)). Naval intelligence officers 
interviewing captured pirates established that the heavily armed boarding teams tend to come from 
the interior and specifically Garowe, with only a hired fisherman / navigator from the coast.59 
Bosasso has long been a pirate port. Nowadays, however, officials in Bosasso make a show of co-
operating with foreign naval forces and pursuing pirates. Ransom negotiations have not been 
conducted from the vicinity of Bosasso since the international naval mission started.60 Bosasso’s 
                                                          
58
 Kraska and Wilson (2009b) 
59
 Interviews with naval intelligence officers. 
60
 Bahadur, I’m not a pirate, 16 April 2009 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article6100783.ece  
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prison is said to house a significant population of pirates.61 Nonetheless, Bosasso is the main port for 
importing pirate equipment such as communications technology, motors and weapons. There is also 
unlikely to be a problem with successful (ex-) pirates investing their newly-found wealth in 
businesses and real estate in Bosasso.62 
 
According to the nightlights data, coastal towns seem to gain little from the pirate business carried 
out in their local waters. Although piracy creates local employment, coastal communities may be 
missing out on investments as they are vulnerable to strikes from the Southern Somali militias 
(Islamists have taken over Gharadeere and Hobyo in the past) and foreign military aircraft patrolling 
the coast.63 In some villages there is even spontaneous local resistance to piracy, which is interfering 
with local fisheries.64 The final part of the analysis will therefore consult high resolution daytime 
images to track changes in development in three main pirate towns. 
 
 
4.2. Analysis of high resolution daytime images 
We compare high resolution satellite images of the coastal pirate towns of Eyl and Hobyo as well as 
the provincial capital Garowe before and after the explosion of piracy in 2008. Before 2008 the area 
was not surveyed frequently (less than once a year), as it is of little commercial interest. Several of 
the few images were partially obscured by clouds making them unusable. Our chosen imagery of Eyl 
was collected on 24 Sep 2005 by IKONUS and 05 Jul 2009 by GEOEYE. Imagery of Hobyo was 
collected by IKONUS on 04 Jul 2006 and by GEOEYE on 24 Jun 2010. The imagery of Garowe was 
collected by IKONUS on 12 Feb 2002 and by GEOEYE on 13 Jul 2009.65 Each image was available in 
orthorectified format, full colour and (almost) cloud free. Spatial ground resolution of the IKONUS 
was approximately 100cms and approximately 50cms for GEOEYE. Each Image was recorded as a 
TIFF file and where necessary converted to JPEG. Photoshop [elements 6] and Arc impression media 
software enabled both manipulation and additional image enhancement and management. The 
resultant images were viewed on a high resolution monitor and printed for stereoscopic viewing on 
a high resolution printer. 
The satellite imagery available was non-stereoscopic and hence detailed interpretation was limited. 
However, since the images were taken at different times and with different angular fields of view it 
was possible to use stereoscopes to provide pseudo 3D images of extant structures and to enhance 
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Garowe Online Puntland Fighting Al Shabab Arresting Pirates 15 September 2010 
http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_Puntland_fighting_Al_Shabaab_arresti
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Horseed Media, 11 Pirates go on Trial in Bosasso Court;  April 2010 
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 Both Foreign office and MoD officials rejected the alternative hypothesis that the observed effect is due to 
Bosasso elites receiving financial transfers from the counter-piracy operation. Personal communication 
received at a Cabinet Office hosted cross-Whitehall meeting in London in March 2011 
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Garowe Online Puntland Forces Arrest Wanted Pirates 18 May 2010  
http://allafrica.com/stories/201005180912.html  
64
 BBC News Somali Vigilantes capture Pirates 28 April 2009 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8022820.stm  
65
 There were no usable images of Gharardeere 
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the detection of change, as well as the visual acuity of the interpreter. The stereoscope used was an 
Abrahams CB model with two enlargement lenses. We focused on changes in settlement size, 
investment in large scale buildings and improvements in local infrastructure.66  Each object, feature 
or installation was studied using high precision optics and high resolution VDUs. The essential factors 
in object identification were its overall shape, its size, any shadow, its colour and tone and the 
related features (e.g. its position, location and any associated activity).67 Ground based imagery 
sourced from the internet was used as scene familiarisation and to provide the additional value of 
‘ground truth’ to verify some aspects of the overhead imagery interpretation. 
 
4.2.1. Image Analysis Eyl 
The town of Eyl has two areas, a lower part situated directly on the coast and an upper part further 
along a valley, presumably to provide shelter from wind or sea-borne raiding parties. There are no 
significant changes in the size or housing density of either settlement, which we call the ‘Fishing 
village’ and ‘Main town’ below. In the fishing village the rather crude system of un-metalled roads 
and paths remain unaltered although some small increase in vehicle numbers was observed. Some 
houses - probably private homes - have also been improved with new roofing and a few newly built. 
The fishing fleet of small boats has largely remained unaltered and there is no upgrade of harbour 
facilities. Some new, fortified storage (?) buildings have been built and older ones are surrounded by 
high perimeter walls in the later image (diagram 10). While perimeter walls are an integral part of 
domestic architecture (for religious reasons), for storage buildings this was not common practice up 
until 2005. The development suggests a combination of a rising value of stored “goods” and  
community tensions. 
A similar situation is seen in the main town (Diagram 11). The roads and paths infrastructure is not 
changed significantly as it might have been if any major scheme for town improvement was 
underway. However, there appear to be significantly more vehicles in the town. A small number of 
new (private) houses have been constructed, mostly on the northern edge of the town and the 
roofing has been upgraded on others. There are two new large buildings in the centre of the town, 
which do not have any cars around them, making it unlikely that they have civic or retail functions. 
The most noticeable changes to existing structures are again the massive perimeter walls erected 
around a number of residential and non-residential buildings, including a compound with two layers 
of security walls. Given that when the first image was taken in 2005, Somalia had already 
experienced 16 years of internal conflict, it is highly likely that the new walls are related to piracy. 
Photographic images from Eyl show that most of the housing is of poor quality with flat roofs, while 
the new houses have pitched roofs and appear to be of a higher quality. In interviews many 
successful pirates say they bought “a house and a car” with their ransom moneys (Hansen 2009, 
p40). The limited new-builds and home improvements in Eyl could well be associated with the 
fishermen hired by inland pirate financiers for their navigational skills. The rest of the population 
does not appear to be earning more than a fistful of dollars from the piracy business, nor is there 
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 We were unable to source images taken at the same time of year, so we are unable to compare cultivation 
activity over time. 
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 Hamshaw-Thomas (1916), Oxlee (1997 and 2000) 
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investment in infrastructure which could be used by the local population, such as roads or harbour 
facilities. Interviews with local residents show considerable local scepticism about the benefits to the 
local community from piracy and several grass-roots anti-piracy initiatives led by clerics have taken 
place.68  The high perimeter walls around major compounds in Eyl suggest that pirates are concerned 
about deteriorating community relations and stand ready to defend their properties and hostages, in 
case locals rise up against the pirates, as has already happened elsewhere.69 
  
4.2.2. Image Analysis Hobyo 
Hobyo is a small settlement of around 5000 people surrounded by encroaching sand dunes. The 
local elder Abdullahi Ahmed Barre s’ complaints "We have no schools, no farming, no fishing. It's 
ground zero here" and “The nearest hospital is an eight-hour drive on a rough road”70 are backed up 
by the image analysis. There is no evidence of upgraded road or harbour infrastructure, nor has 
Hobyo grown significantly in size. However, there are some signs of increased private affluence: 
traffic in Hobyo appears to have increased and some alterations to existing buildings are evident. 
There are also a a few new, larger than average, thickly walled dwellings concentrated on the town’s 
northern end. Hobyo has a small beach area away from the town where boat launching take place. 
The launch place has not shown change, although there is marginally greater activity on the later 
imagery. 
The main change to Hobyo’s infrastructure is a new, heavily secured communications centre with a 
tall microwave broadcasting relay tower on the northern end of Hobyo (diagram 12). This could be 
part of a wider telecommunications network working at UHF frequencies.  Since these systems are 
more or less line-of-sight, such towers are tall; the lattice construction ameliorates the impact of 
high winds. Signals from other masts in the system are beamed to Hobyo, where they are received 
by microwave dish aerials, amplified and sent on line of sight to the next relay or terminal. Radio 
signals and telephone signals for local consumption are beamed omni-directionally to the immediate 
area. Hobyo’s relay tower seems to operate in several directions as it has a number of dishes each 
aligned differently. The system is likely to be the one used by Radio Hobyo.71 However, it is also 
extremely useful for pirates: “When a pirated vessel arrives within VHF radio range of Hobyo, pirates 
in small boats provide re-supply for food, weapons, and personnel reinforcements.”72 We may 
therefore be seeing some give and take between pirates and the local community and hence 
reasonable relationships. While perimeter security around the radio tower appears to be strong, we 
do not observe massive investment in fortification elsewhere around the town, even though Hobyo 
processes a large number of ships for ransom.  
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4.2.3. Garowe 
Garowe is the capital of Puntland, with a population of between 40-70,00073 and is situated well 
inland. Here we see investment and wealth on a completely different scale from the coastal 
communities. Between February 2002 and July 2009 the town almost doubled in area with 
significant housing and light industrial/commercial developments to the South East and South of the 
town (Diagram 13). North of the town, on the other side of the Togga-Garowe River and along the 
main highway to the West many new large scale buildings and commercial developments are 
noticeable (Diagram 14). In the centre of town existing facilities seem to have undergone 
development both in terms of expansion, roofing and security and the increase in traffic too appears 
to be substantial – to the extent that the 2008 UN Habitat consultation speaks of traffic 
congestion.74 Diagram 15 illustrates the changes in a part of the central area around the central 
market, which appears to be greatly enhanced. In the outlined rectangular area to the East of the 
market there have been at least 30 major developments of either newly built or improved houses 
and outlets during the period. The improvements include extra security, cosmetic enhancements 
and/or enlargement. There is also evidence that a greater number of private cars and vehicles are 
appearing inside the enclosed areas of properties or just outside. On the edges of town, patterns of 
roads [albeit un-metalled] are laid out for further development, indicating plans for further growth. 
Using photographic images from flickr and photographs and reports from Somalinet and Garowe 
Online it is possible to identify a number of the larger buildings, as well as the dates of their 
completion. The buildings on the northern edge of the town are associated with the foreign 
sponsored Puntland State University and the hospital, both of which have seen some enlargement 
since 2002. A new development is the Teacher Training College, which opened in 2004.75 The UN 
guest house and compound was completed in 2007.76 Some of the recent development in Garowe is 
clearly associated with UN and NGO funds supporting the Puntland government. These tend to be 
medium to large-scale projects: UN Habitat and its various sponsors have for example invested in 
the upgrading of municipal buildings and the slaughterhouse. On the Southern side of the town the 
UN completed several large compounds to house internally displaced people (IDP).77  
Returnees from the diaspora may also be investing in housing in Garowe, though emigration from 
Puntland is more recent than from Somaliland and the diaspora is therefore less able to contribute 
to growth at home.78 Nonetheless, in the centre of town the existing mosque was replaced with the 
much larger Masjid al Huda with its large minaret clearly visible (diagram 16). It was funded by public 
donations79 and completed in May 2008 at a cost of $350,000.80 
                                                          
73
  UN sources find it difficult to estimate the population due to the large number of IDPs. UN Habitat (2008)  
74
 ibid 
75
  http://puntlandstateuniversity.com/   and http://www.gtecsom.org/  
76
 http://www.geolocation.ws/v/P/32812835/un-compound-garowe/en  
77
 UN Habitat (2008) 
78
 Many Somaliland Issaq emigrated under Siad Barre’s regime in the 70 and 80s and are investing at home. 
http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Returning_to_Somaliland_to_shape_the_future
.shtml  
79
 http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Islam_28/Somalia_Donate_to_the_construction_of_Al-
Huda_Mosque_in_Garowe_printer.shtml  
80
 http://www.somalinet.com/forums/viewtopic.php?f=246&t=163717  
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This leaves pirate money as a likely contributor to the rapid growth of this town at the heart of the 
pirates’ tribal homeland. The main North-South Highway seems to offer significant opportunities for 
business investment. The number of businesses servicing cars and trucks and retail areas (with 
associated car parking) has grown significantly. This contradicts the assertion that imported SUVs 
have a minimal impact on the local economy. Several of the large scale new developments to the 
South of Garowe are hotels, mostly opening in 2009 / 10.81  The Hotel Makkah82 and the New Rays 
Hotel are clearly built for rich customers and an internet commentator on the New Rays opening 
reports jokes about “pirate money”.83  
Regarding the residential developments, it is commonly asserted by local residents that pirates are 
living and spending money in Garowe – they are said to be easily identifiable by their flash cars, 
lavish weddings and expensive drug habits.84 Reports and interviews show that pirates have been 
living in Garowe for several years.85 The satellite images provide some evidence for this: in the 2002 
image it is very rare to see any cars associated with residential buildings – even though the image 
was taken on a Friday and privately owned vehicles would have been likely to be parked at home. 
Traffic is concentrated in the immediate vicinity of the main highway. In the 2009 image car 
ownership is still rare. However, there are now a significant number of houses in residential areas of 
town with a car parked within the perimeter walls. In most cases these are newly-built, not 
particularly large houses with very noticeable security walls, often in small clusters of other new 
houses with cars (see diagram 17 for two examples). The structures look considerably less flash and 
elaborate than those marketed to foreign investors with a minimum price tag in the region of 
US$45,000.86 While the “home + car” combination is evidence of “new money” rather than “pirate 
money”, it should be interpreted in combination with the pirates’ own statements that they tend to 
buy “a house and a car” and the local residents’ common assertion that piracy and car ownership are 
linked. 
 
4.2.4. Summary 
The high resolution satellite imagery analysis complements the results of the previous strands of 
investigation. There is evidence of new affluence in the three locations Eyl, Hobyo but especially in 
Garowe. Investment in Garowe is on a completely different scale to that in the coastal areas. 
Although Garowe has been able to attract international sponsorship, it also appears to attract 
considerable private investment into housing and new businesses. If “new house + car” ownership 
can be assumed to be linked to piracy it confirms that a) a considerable proportion of ransom money 
is spent in country, b) pirates’ private housing investments tend to be relatively low-key indicating 
                                                          
81
 These are not visible in the maps in UN habitat (2008). 
82
 http://www.flickr.com/photos/puntland/3341438763/  
83
 http://www.somalilife.com/vbforum/showthread.php?t=93217  
84
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/24/a-pioneer-of-somali-piracy, 
http://www.somalinet.com/forums/viewtopic.php?f=18&t=254668   
85
 http://www.somaliaonline.com/community/showthread.php/37905-Infamous-Abshir-Boyax-captured-in-a-
government-offensive-outside-Garowe-State-Capital , http://www.puntland-
gov.net/viewnews.asp?nwtype=News&nid=News204852118105379706  
86
 E.g. http://www.mubarakonline.com/  
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that there are social norms limiting conspicuous consumption, and c) concentrated inland rather 
than on the coast. The imagery from Eyl suggests that there are some issues in the community 
relations of pirates and that there may be opportunities to exploit local tensions to find a solution to 
the piracy problem by making the coastal communities significantly better off.   
 
5. Conclusions 
The paper has firstly demonstrated the impact of the piracy sector both on the local and on the 
national economy of Somalia. Piracy has created direct employment and considerable multiplier 
effects in the economy even if a significant proportion of the proceeds from piracy are invested in 
foreign goods and some of it is channeled abroad. The distribution of the gains of piracy follows 
traditional patterns in Somalia, with redistribution through clan networks and employment 
generation in urban centres far from the coast. Somalia remains an inward-looking country: much of 
the investment is well away from the seaboard, where it is more vulnerable to destruction and 
expropriation. The observation that the gains from piracy were at least partially offset by the 
contemporary rise in international food prices may explain the negative testimonies of local 
residents vis-à-vis the media regarding the impact of piracy.  
Our result that one should expect a numerically large pro-pirate lobby should not discourage the 
international community from seeking a land-based solution. The total cost of piracy off the Horn of 
Africa (including the counter-piracy measures) was estimated to be in the region of US$7-12 bn for 
2010, while ransoms paid in 2010 were said to be in the region of US$ 250mn (Bowden (2010)).  
Even if Somali communities received all of the current ransoms, replacing this source of income (for 
example with a combination of a foreign-funded coastguard and development aid) would be 
considerably cheaper than continuing the current policy. 
Secondly, the paper makes the case that even in a statistical desert such as Somalia, there are 
interesting time series data to be constructed from information collected locally and by remote 
sensing. We established that there is information content in absent data in the records and price 
discrepancies in standardised commodities between locations. These can be used to proxy for 
developments in market imperfections over time. The evidence from images created by remote 
sensing indicates that this source of data should be exploited methodically in future work on the 
nexus of development and security, in particular in environments characterised by state failure, 
where research has been hampered by the paucity of economic data.  
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Diagram 2 
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Diagram 3 
Weather Stations in Somalia
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Diagram 4 
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Diagram 5 
 
Diagram 6: Somalia Nightlights 2009 
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Diagram 7: total nightlight emissions from Somali cities 
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Diagram 8: Number of pixels lit in Somali cities 
 
Diagram 9: maximum light emission from Somali cities 
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Diagram 10: Fishing Village Eyl Sept 2005 vs July 2009 
 
Diagram 11:  Main Town Eyl Sept 2005 vs July 2009 
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Diagram 12: Hobyo July 2006 vs June 2010 
 
Diagram 13: Garowe overall growth 
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Diagram 14 South West Garowe Feb 2002 vs July 2009 
 Diagram 15: Changes in Central Garowe Friday 12 Feb 2002 vs Monday 13 June 2009  
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Diagram 16: Central Garowe Feb 2002 vs July 2009: Mosque 
 
 
Diagram 17: Central Garowe Feb 2002 vs July 2009: “House + Car” 
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Tables 
Table 1 Real wages (daily labour rate / rice price) 
 Muduq Nugal Bari Banaadir 
FAO food index -0.0238*** -0.0289*** -0.0294*** -0.0289** 
 (0.0042) (0.0047) (0.0055)    (0.0119)    
S.Sh / US$ -0.0675*** -0.1073*** -0.1628*** -0.2288*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0208) (0.0235)    (0.0446)    
Missing market  0.1772*** -0.0497 0.1702** 0.4398*** 
(Sorghum) (0.0612) (0.0858) (0.0653)     (0.1171)      
UIC 0.9027*** 0.9466*** 1.1931*** 4.4345*** 
 (0.3160) (0.3362)     (0.4234)      (0.8021)      
Southwest 
Monsoon 
-0.4804*** -0.1759 -0.2747 -0.6608* 
 (0.1519) (0.1676)     (0.2039)    (0.3791)   
Camel Exports 0.1269*** 0.0787*** 0.075** 0.1754*** 
(1000s) (0.0264) (0.0282)     (0.0352)     (0.069)    
Piracy  0.0370*** 0.0658*** 0.0463*** -0.0116 
(6 months moving average) (0.0125) (0.0134)      (0.0167)      (0.0320)     
Constant 6.990*** 10.627*** 11.937*** 12.997*** 
 (0.4559) (0.5112)     (0.6096)     (1.1975)     
Number of 
observations 
120 111 119 121 
     
R-squared 0.6146 0.6615 0.7267 0.6781 
 
Table 2  Exchange rates 
 % depreciation SSH / 
US$ 
% depreciation 
SSH / US$ 
FAO Food Index 0.0691*** 0.0340* 
 (0.0212) 0.0204 
Cattle exports -0.2732*** -0.3459*** 
(1000s) (0.0752) (0.0707) 
Pirate success(t-5) -0.4464** -0.5901*** 
 (0.2246) (0.2044) 
Price variation Xr  -0.8731*** 
  (0.2135) 
Price variation rice  -0.5954*** 
  (0.1447) 
Constant -3.3261 14.4861*** 
 (2.4008) 3.8605 
Observations 126 126 
R-squared 0.1398 0.3355 
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Table 3 Average price of 1 kg of imported rice (SSh)  
 Month on month change in 
rice price (SSh) 
Month on month change in 
rice price (SSh) 
North East Monsoon -656.7114*** 
(250.1218) 
-907.595*** 
(271.3141) 
FAO Food Price index 31.42001*** 
(5.4500) 
46.8045*** 
(8.4586) 
Exchange rate depreciation 92.2715*** 
(20.9883) 
143.4241*** 
(32.0743) 
Piracy (6 months moving 
average) 
-68.27333*** 
(16.2014) 
-46.6526*** 
(17.8196) 
Price variation XR 111.0499* 
(57.7344) 
159.2268* 
(83.0809) 
Contract security 
(extrapolated June 09-Dec 10) 
 -27.6336*** 
(7.9212) 
Constant -3527.639*** 
672.0924 
-4213.006*** 
(808.7313) 
Number of Observations 126  108  
R-squared 0.4006 0.4841 
 
Table 4 Cattle prices (SSh) 
 Muduq Nugal Bari Muduq 
Lagged regional 
cattle price 
0.8181*** 
(0.0587) 
0.7979708*** 
(0.0502)     
0.8117*** 
(0.0573) 
0.8879*** 
(0.0330) 
FAO  
Cerealindex 
5568.771** 
(2260.481)    
12350.4*** 
(3122.429) 
9016.777*** 
(3262.898) 
4452.126** 
(2126.703) 
Piracy 
6 months moving 
average 
40997.33*** 
(16148.89) 
33341.94*** 
(13004.57) 
55306.16*** 
(14313.34) 
  
Pirate success t-2    60888.68* 
(33921.47) 
Pirate success t-3    69769.2** 
(35140.14) 
Constant -208906.7 
(231994.1) 
-678386.0** 
(285563.9) 
-516384.4* 
(266712.3) 
-223376.9 
(224149.9) 
Observations 119 98 118 122 
R-Squared 0.9453 0.9479 0.9722 0.9466 
 
 
